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INTRODUCTION
The 147 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) reached an agreement July 31, 2004,
on the framework for the final phase of the Doha Development Agenda of global trade talks.
After failing to reach such an agreement at the Cancun ministerial meeting in September, 2003,
this framework agreement puts the Doha Round back on-track. Negotiations on the details will
begin in September 2004. The original deadline to complete talks by January 1, 2005, has been
postponed, and the next WTO Ministerial Conference will be held in Hong Kong in December
2005, at which point the talks could near their conclusion.
The objective of this report is to analyze the potential impact of the framework agreement on U.S.
agriculture. Most of the details of the agreement have not yet been determined, so an in-depth
empirical analysis of the Doha Round is not possible. The agreement does, however, provide a
number of objectives and a framework for the final agreement which can be analyzed.
WHAT THE WTO AGREEMENT SAYS FOR AGRICULTURE
The three pillars for the WTO negotiations for agriculture are domestic support, export
competition, and market access. With regard to domestic support, the framework agreement
calls for each member's total trade-distorting support to be cut by 20 percent from currently
allowed levels in the first year of implementation. The level of permitted trade-distorting support
targeted for reduction includes the Final Bound Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) plus
the permitted de minimus level and blue box support. Further reductions will take place in
subsequent years according to a yet-to-be-determined tiered formula. Under the tiered formula,
countries having higher levels of trade-distorting support will make greater overall reductions
in order to achieve a harmonizing result. Final bound total AMS will also be reduced according
to a tiered formula, and product-specific AMSs will be capped at their respective average levels
according to a methodology to be agreed on. According to the agreement, blue box support will
not exceed 5 percent of a country's average total value of agricultural production during a historical
period, and green box criteria will be reviewed and clarified to ensure that green box measures
have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.
Under the pillar of export competition, the framework agreement calls for the elimination of
export subsidies, as well as export credits with repayment periods beyond 180 days. The schedule
for the elimination of these export subsidies and credits has not yet been determined. The
framework also calls for greater discipline and transparency of state trading enterprises (STEs).
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Trade distorting practices with respect to exporting STEs are to be eliminated, including export
subsidies provided to or by them, government financing, and the underwriting of losses.
Finally, greater market access will occur through the reduction of tariffs. Tariff reductions will be
made through a tiered formula that takes into account different tariff structures. Deeper cuts will
be made for higher tariffs, which should lead to greater harmonization in tariff levels across
countries. Reductions will remain flexible, however, for sensitive products.
Special and differential treatment for developing countries exists throughout the agreement.
Developing countries will be allowed longer implementation periods for the reduction of tariffs
and domestic support and the phasing out of export subsidies, as well as other special
considerations.
DISADVANTAGES FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
The plan to reduce domestic support could affect future U.S. farm programs. The allowable limit
of trade-distorting domestic support is reduced by 20 percent in the first year of the agreement,
with future cuts to come in subsequent years. It is important to note that this is a 20 percent cut in
permitted spending levels - not actual spending levels. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoelick
has said that the 20 percent cut would not affect current U.S. farm-spending levels because of the
way it is structured.1  Under this structure, the cut applies not just to amber box payments but to
total allowable trade-distorting payments, including the de minimus and the blue box. The
agreement states that "the overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic support, as measured
as the Final Bound Total AMS plus permitted de minimus level and the level agreed...for Blue
Box payments, will be reduced according to a tiered formula" and "as the first installment of the
overall cut...the sum of all trade-distorting support will not exceed 80 percent of the sum of Final
Bound Total AMS plus permitted de minimus plus the Blue Box."2  The current de minimus
exemption rule permits product-specific support to be excluded from the AMS calculation if the
total outlay is less than 5 percent of the value of that product's production, and non-product
specific support outlays may be exempted from the AMS calculation if they fail to exceed 5 percent
of the total value of a country's agricultural production.3
The United States is permitted to spend $49 billion per year on total trade-distorting domestic
support but has actually been spending considerably less than that. Over the last three years, the
United States has spent about $23 billion annually on trade-distorting farm subsidies.4  Therefore,
a 20 percent reduction in allowable trade-distorting subsidies from $49 billion to $39 billion would
not affect current U.S. farm spending levels. It would restrict the amount the United States could
spend on farm subsidies, however, if prices were to fall to a level where more than $39 billion
would be paid out under the current farm program.
1Reuters, "Sen. Daschle Wrong on WTO Farm Deal - USTR Zoelick." August 5, 2004.
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Figure 1 is a graph depicting the operation of the U.S. target price system and the restrictions of
the bounded domestic support level currently allowed  by the WTO. Line A-B represents the
relationship between the market price and government spending. Current total federal trade-
distorting payments for all crops equal $23 billion annually at an average price level of P1. When
the average price decreases from P1 to P3, total government payments would increase to $49 billion,
which represents the current bounded subsidy level allowed by the WTO. A 20 percent reduction
in the bounded domestic support would place the level at $39.2 billion. If the price level drops to
P2, average domestic support will be $39.2 billion. As long as the price level is maintained above
P2, the reduction in permitted domestic support will not have any effect on producers. If the price
level drops below P2, total return for the producers will be reduced. With the current level of
federal payments limits, the potential producer return is represented by line ACFH, as prices
drop. With a 20 percent reduction in allowable domestic support, the potential producers total
return is line ACEG. The price level P2 is the point when the reduction begins to affect producer
return.
Table 1 shows an estimation of various federal payment levels and average price levels. National
counter-cyclical payments were estimated at various price levels to determine when and if federal
support would exceed the new limit. Current spending is about $23 billion, which is shown in
column 3. Recent prices for the major commodities are also shown in column 3. The next columns


















Figure 1. Federal Domestic Support Level Limits and Relative Prices
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that all prices move together. As commodity prices drop, federal spending increases. A 95 percent
price level requires federal spending of $27 billion. At an 80 percent price level, federal spending
exceeds the lower bounded support level of $39.2 billion. At that point, the representative prices
are $2.54 for wheat, $1.72 for corn, and $3.96 for soybeans. The last row in the table shows the
number of years during the past three decades that the national price of wheat was lower than
the recent average price. For example, 12 times during the past 30 years, the national price was
lower than the current average of $3.17. The price for wheat was lower than the 80 percent level
of  $2.54 only three times during the past 30 years.
A 20 percent reduction in the allowed domestic support level would most likely not have any
effect on U.S. producers. In only three years (1977, 1986, and 1999), prices of wheat were lower
than that level. However, if the amount of the reduction were increased in the future, effects of
the reduction would be felt more often as the market price fell below the maximum payment
limit prices.
The 20 percent reduction in allowable spending is just the beginning of cuts. While the initial
reduction in permitted farm subsidies may not have any effect on actual U.S. farm spending
levels, future cuts under the WTO agreement could result in a reduction in actual farm spending
levels. The degree of those future cuts is not yet known. The agreement also says that in addition
to cutting total permitted trade-distorting support, final bound total AMS will also be substantially
reduced. This cut would likely affect the level of U.S. amber box payments and could lead to a
restructuring of farm program payments.
In theory, cuts in domestic subsidies could reduce production in marginal land in most countries,
which would increase world prices of subsidized crops. However, this may not happen, mainly
because agricultural production is not sensitive to subsidy levels in these countries.
Table 1. Counter-cyclical and other Trade Distorting Payments for the Past Three Years
Average Price and Alternative Prices of Major Program Crops 
 Average
 Price 95% 90% 85% 80%
 Wheat $/bu 3.17 3.01 2.85 2.69 2.54
 Corn $/bu 2.15 2.04 1.93 1.82 1.72
 Soybeans $/bu 4.96 4.71 4.46 4.21 3.96
 Rice $/cwt 4.23 4.01 3.80 3.59 3.38
 Cotton $/lbs 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32
Total Subsidy
 Payments
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The elimination of export credits with repayment periods beyond 180 days could have a negative
effect on U.S. exports. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) export credit programs
offer loan guarantees for markets that many commercial lenders consider too risky. Much of the
credit is on terms of up to three years. These USDA programs underwrite credit extended by the
private banking sector in the United States to approved foreign banks. The Export Credit
Guarantee Program (GSM-102) covers credit from 90 days to three years, and the Intermediate
Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103) covers longer credit terms up to 10 years. In recent
years, the USDA has offered about $4.5 billion in loan guarantees per year under GSM-102 and
about $150 - $200 million per year under GSM-103. The level of actual exporter applications
received for the GSM-102 program has averaged about $3 billion per year in recent years. Almost
all of the export credit under the GSM-102 program is on terms of 24 months or 36 months.5
Limiting the repayment period to 180 days or less could have some negative effects on exports,
but it was a concession the U.S. negotiators were willing to give in order to get the European
Union (EU) to agree to the elimination of exports subsidies.
BENEFITS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
Benefits for U.S. agriculture from this framework agreement include the elimination of export
subsidies, the harmonization of trade-distorting domestic support, cuts in tariffs and the
harmonization of tariffs rates, and greater discipline over STEs. These measures should create a
more even playing field.
The United States is sure to benefit from the elimination of export subsidies since the European
Union is the only major user of export subsidies. The formula to harmonize trade-distorting
domestic support should also help the United States since the EU's domestic support levels are
much higher than those in the United States. The EU currently spends about $71 billion per year
on total trade-distorting domestic support, and its allowable limit is $127 billion. The initial
reduction in allowable spending will not affect the current EU spending level, but future cuts
could affect EU farm subsidy spending since the tiered formula for domestic support reduction
will require WTO members with higher levels of trade-distorting domestic support to make greater
overall reductions.
Increases in market access throughout the world will benefit U.S. agriculture. U.S. tariffs on
agricultural products are among the lowest in the world, so a reduction in tariffs will likely
increase U.S. exports more than imports. The tariff reduction formula also calls for deeper cuts in
higher tariffs, which would benefit the United States. Special and differential treatment given to
developing countries could somewhat lessen the increase in market access, but the agreement
calls for substantial improvements in market access for all products.
Finally, the United States could benefit from greater discipline over STEs. The agreement could
force the Canadian Wheat Board to become more transparent, and it would eliminate any trade-
distorting practices used by the Canadian Wheat Board or other exporting STEs.6 Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies
CONCLUSIONS
Although a lack of details about the WTO agreement limits the ability to complete any in-depth
empirical analysis, some general analysis can be conducted on the recent framework agreement
agreed to by the WTO members. Possible negative effects for U.S. agriculture include a reduction
in farm subsidies and restrictions on the use of export credits. The initial 20 percent cut in allowable
trade-distorting domestic support will not affect current U.S. farm spending levels, though future
spending levels could be affected if prices fall low enough or if the WTO agreement calls for
significant future cuts in domestic support. The agreement will call for future reductions in
allowable spending on trade-distorting domestic support, but the exact amount is not yet known.
The effect of the WTO agreement on U.S. farm programs will depend largely on the details of the
agreement, which have not yet been negotiated. Negotiations on the details begin in September
2004. Restricting the repayment period to 180 days or less on export credits could have a negative
effect on U.S. exports, but the elimination of export subsidies by the EU - the only major user of
export subsidies - and greater discipline over the Canadian Wheat Board could make U.S.
agricultural exports more competitive. The United States would also benefit from increased market
access and greater harmonization between the United States and the EU in trade-distorting
domestic support.